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Civil unrest is a powerful form of collective human dynamics, which has led to major 
transitions of societies in modern history. The study of collective human dynamics, 
including collective aggression, has been the focus of much discussion in the context of 
modeling and identification of universal patterns of behavior. In contrast, the possibility 
that civil unrest activities, across countries and over long time periods, are governed by 
universal mechanisms has not been explored. Here, we analyze records of civil unrest of 
170 countries during the period 1919-2008. We demonstrate that the distributions of the 
number of unrest events per year are robustly reproduced by a nonlinear, spatially 
extended dynamical model, which reflects the spread of civil disorder between geographic 
regions connected through social and communication networks. The results also expose the 
similarity between global social instability and the dynamics of natural hazards and 
epidemics. 
 
Civil unrest contagion occurs when social, economic, and political stress accumulate slowly, and 
is released spontaneously in the form of social unrest on short time scales to nearest and long-
range neighboring regions that are susceptible to social, economic, and political stress (1-5). 
Unrest events have led to significant societal and cultural changes throughout history. Examples 
include the spread of discontent in France in 1848 that proliferated to most of Europe and parts 
of Latin America; the wave of urban racial riots in the United States in the 1960s; and the 1989 
uprisings against communism in various central and eastern European countries, symbolized by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. More recently, social instability has spread rapidly in the Arab world 
‒ from nonviolent protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt that toppled long-established 
authoritarian regimes, to a protest movement that evolved to a full-blown civil war in Libya. 
These social unrest events span the full spectrum from civil wars, revolutions, and coups d'état 
that have killed millions of people to relatively peaceful forms of intra-state conflicts, such as 
anti-government demonstrations, riots, and general strikes (5-10). 
 A pertinent question from large-scale social dynamics and policymaking standpoints is what 
causes the extent and outbreaks of civil unrest spreading. Social unrest has been attributed to a 
variety of social, political, economic, and environmental causes including racial and ethnic 
tensions (11), food scarcity and food price increases (6-10), variations in international 
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commodity prices (12, 13), economic shocks (14), climate change and rainfall shocks (15, 16) 
and demographic changes (17). Despite these conditions, we show that external causes are not 
necessary to explain the observed magnitude of almost a century of riots and collective protests 
across the world. Instead, we provide a parsimonious explanation of social unrest dynamics 
based on a hypothesis that widespread unrest arises from internal processes of positive feedback 
and cascading effects in the form of contagion and social diffusion over spatially interdependent 
regions connected through social and mass communication networks. We analyze records of 
civil unrest events, compiled from newspaper reports, of 170 countries covering the period of 
1919 through 2008 (see SI-1). The long-term event dataset analyzed here includes the number of 
incidents of three main indicators: anti-government demonstrations, riots, and general strikes. 
We group countries by their geographical region (see SI-2), and study the corresponding 
distributions of the number of civil unrest events per year. The results reported here (described 
later and shown in Fig. 3) also apply at the level of individual countries. Fig. 1 shows the size 
distributions of the number of unrest incidents (the sum over the three event indicators) for 
various geographical regions of the world (see SI-2). The data indicates that there is a wide 
variation in the characteristics of civil unrest with no apparent pattern of unrest dynamics in time 
or geographical space. Although the study of collective human dynamics, including collective 
aggression, has been the focus of much discussion in the context of modeling and identification 
of universal patterns of behavior (18-25), the mechanisms leading to this diverse behavior of 
social unrest are unclear, and have never been attempted before. Here, we consider social 
instability as a generalized spatial epidemics phenomenon, similar to other spatially extended 
dynamical systems in the physical and biological sciences, such as earthquakes, forest fires, and 
epidemics (26-28). Our model provides a parsimonious quantitative framework that is able to 
explain and reproduce the full range of empirical civil unrest event count distributions for all 
regions as shown in Fig. 1. 
 The model (shown schematically in Fig. 2) divides the country into sites ("urban clusters") 
placed on a two-dimensional grid. We assume that unrest activity is transmitted, with 
infectiousness probability  , along two kinds of links: short-range links between sites that are 
directly adjacent to each other in either the horizontal and vertical directions; and long-range 
links created with probability   between each site and another site selected uniformly at random 
from the grid. The connectedness between sites on the grid reflects geographic proximity, social 
proximity, and proximity within the mass communication networks along which social instability 
is transmitted. Social, economic, and political stress accumulates slowly on the grid with 
probability   per site (‘unrest susceptibility’ rate), which then become susceptible to unrest 
activity. Social unrest is released spontaneously with probability   per susceptible site 
(‘spontaneous outburst’ rate), and is diffused on short time scales to nearest and distant 
susceptible sites. This activity can lead to further instabilities and avalanches of unrest events 
throughout the grid. We measure the simulated incidence of civil unrest by the number of sites 
that are involved in the spread of unrest activity. 
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Figure 1| Observed civil unrest event count distributions. We measure the incidence of civil 
unrest events per year by summing over the reported country-level number of anti-government 
demonstrations, riots, and general strikes (see SI-1), for all countries within a particular 
subregion of the world (see SI-2). The figure shows the log-log plot of the complementary 
cumulative distribution of civil unrest event count,       . (A) Unrest event count 
distributions for  geographical subregions of Asia: Western Asia (); South-Eastern Asia (); 
Eastern Asia (); Southern Central Asia (). (B) Unrest event count distributions for 
geographical subregions of Africa: Western Africa (); Southern Africa (); Middle Africa 
(); Eastern Africa (). (C) Unrest event count distributions for geographical subregions of 
Europe: Western Europe (); Southern Europe (); Northern Europe (); Eastern Europe (). 
(D) Unrest event count distributions for geographical subregions of America: Caribbean, Central, 
and South America (); North America (). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2| Social unrest spatial contagion model. The model is defined on a square grid of 
    sites, which represents the division of a country into urban clusters (see SI-4). Each site of 
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the grid can be in one of three different states: empty ("white"), susceptible to social unrest 
("red"), and involved in social unrest ("crowd"). Sites are one grid step apart if they are directly 
adjacent to each other in either the horizontal or vertical direction, or are connected through 
weak links (e.g., site E4 is connected to site F2). The weak links are formed by associating with 
each site, with probability  , a single link to a site selected uniformly at random from the grid. 
The grid is updated synchronously according to the following rules: at each time step, empty 
sites become susceptible with probability  , and susceptible sites become involved in social 
unrest with probability  . Unrest contagion occurs on a short time scale as follows. If a site is 
involved in social unrest (e.g., sites B2 and E4), the unrest activity spreads with probability   to 
susceptible sites that are one grid step apart (e.g., sites C2, B3, or D5), which in turn can lead 
(with probability  ) to further instabilities of susceptible sites that are two grid steps apart, three 
grid steps apart, and so on. Each of the sites involved in social unrest during a time step 
contributes to the size of the unrest contagion.            
 
 We have specified a plausible size for the grid based on changes in the average population of 
a country over the period analyzed (1919 to 2008), and a characteristic urban cluster as defined 
by the U.S. Census Bureau (see SI-4). The outburst ( ) and susceptibility ( ) rates have been set 
such that      , which reflects the time scale separation that often underlies riots, unrest 
and revolutions (5-10). This leaves only two free parameters: the probability   of establishing 
long-range links between sites, and the infectiousness rate   of transmitting social instability on 
short time scales to nearest and distant susceptible sites. Given a set of parameters, a computer 
simulation was run for a number of time steps (see SI-4), and the simulated distribution of the 
total unrest event count was determined. The free parameters associated with specific 
geographical regions of the world were chosen by minimizing the statistical distance between the 
simulated and empirical distributions (see SI-3). Using these parameters in the computer 
simulation model, we find that the model is able to reproduce the observed distributions 
remarkably well over the full range of the world's geographic regions (Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3| Observed data and best-fit curves for civil unrest event count distributions. 
Observed values are denoted by circles. Solid best-fit lines denote average distributions 
calculated from 500 realizations of the social unrest contagion model. The goodness of fit of the 
model relative to the empirically observed unrest event count distributions was determined by 
measuring the distance between the observed and simulated distributions (SI-3). Here, we use the 
tail-weighted Kolmogorov–Smirnov (wKS) statistic (SI-4). The fit of the model is very good for 
all regions. Goodness-of-fit (wKS) and fitted parameters (   ) for all regions: Western Asia = 
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0.1269 (      ,       ), South-Eastern Asia = 0.1581 (     ,       ), Eastern Asia 
= 0.1492 (      ,       ), Southern Central Asia = 0.1078 (     ,       ), Western 
Africa = 0.1749 (     ,       ), Southern Africa = 0.2513 (     ,       ), Middle 
Africa = 0.1856 (     ,       ), Eastern Africa = 0.1191 (      ,       ), Western 
Europe = 0.1436 (      ,       ), Southern Europe = 0.11220 (      ,       ), 
Northern Europe = 0.16 (      ,       ), Eastern Europe = 0.1634 (      ,       ), 
Caribbean, Central, and South America = 0.0707 (     ,       ), North America = 0.2349 
(     ,       ). Values of wKS that are less than 0.3 represent good fits (SI-3). 
 
 The unrest contagion model is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a wide range of possible 
unrest event count distributions. “Broad-scale” distributions that show a power–law regime with 
a sharp cutoff in the tail are obtained when the infectiousness rate    , and when the outburst 
rate   is very small relative to the susceptibility rate   (i.e.,   ⁄   ), even in the absence of 
long-range connections (   ). ‘‘Single-scale’’ distributions with fast-decaying tails arise 
when the infectiousness rate    , in which case augmenting the grid with a network of long-
range connections (   ) could lead to broad-scale distributions. In general, different forms of 
social or communication networks that connect the regions of the country will generate different 
civil unrest event count distributions.  
 The unrest contagion patterns of each of the world's geographic regions (Fig. 1) are uniquely 
characterized by the parameters of the model (Fig. 3). Unlike critical phenomena where 
universality arises from the irrelevance of particular details of the system (29), here universality 
arises from the fact that social unrest contagion is governed by the same mechanisms despite 
idiosyncrasies of individual countries and geographic regions. The mechanisms we uncover 
separate the phenomenon of rioting and social instability into three time scales: the unrest 
infectiousness rate from disrupted regions to neighboring regions that are susceptible to social 
unrest, the rate by which regions become susceptible to unrest activity due to social, economic, 
and political stress, and the rate by which social unrest is released spontaneously in susceptible 
regions (        The spatial contagion mechanism here arises from interdependence of 
closely related regions; people participate in collective protest because of long-standing social, 
economic, and political stress, and because others have recently done so. If rioters see others they 
might respond similarly even if their external conditions have not changed, and protests spreads 
across social networks and from place to place. While our parsimonious model does not prove 
that exogenous causes play no role in determining the intensity of civil unrest, it does say that 
exogenous causes are not necessary to explain the observed data, and that the pursuit of 
independent variables that predict the occurrence of civil unrest events in space and time may be 
illusory.  
 Our results have several practical implications. First, the parameters of the model can be 
estimated from unrest data that includes small and medium sized events, and then be used to 
quantify the risk of large-sized events. Second, monitoring the parameters of the model and 
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trends in their values over time through comprehensive ongoing unrest data, may serve as an 
early warning signal for increased vulnerability to social instability.  
 Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Marcus A. M. de Aguiar, Zvi Bar-Yam, and Irving R. 
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